Reduce the return to holding money below zero. Imagine that the Fed were to announce that, one year from today, it would pick a digit from 0 to 9 out of a hat. All currency with a serial number ending in that digit would no longer be legal tender. Suddenly, the expected return to holding currency would become negative 10 percent.

It definitely is an unorthodox solution that would be difficult to implement in practice but it’s also novel and interesting and it helps us understand why certain solutions work and others don’t:

I understand that this plan is not entirely practical. But you have to give the student credit for thinking out of the box. And his plan does address a fundamental problem facing the economy right now: Given the fall in wealth, increases in risk premiums, and problems in the banking system, the interest rate consistent with full employment might well be negative.

One key challenge to coming up with good solutions to problems is understanding why things are the way they currently are and what an ideal solution would have to accomplish. Coming up with good ideas that don’t quite cut it is an excellent learning process for getting closer to the optimal solution.

Update: The Economist talks about Switzerland charging foreigners a fee to keep their money there in the 1970s – effectively imposing a negative interest rate (this would have to be a percentage of the assets kept there instead of a lump sum).

However, if the current crisis has taught us anything, it is that nations are interlinked. The economic decoupling was a myth and the economic crisis is hurting everyone and endangering many US foreign policy priorities, including the recovery of Iraq. Because of this I was extremely shocked to see the following shortsightedness from Richard Posner:

I think the big foundations, such as the Gates foundation (the biggest), should be strongly urged to redirect their extensive foreign charity to the United States at this time of depression. I am not suggesting that his projects should “Buy American,” in the sense of buying U.S. products to give to foreign recipients of his charities. The point is rather that charity should begin at home when home is suffering.

I agree that in these tough times all of us who have steady incomes should help less fortunate ones by donating more to local charities. But taking away funding from the developing world would both be immoral and counter productive. These countries are already suffering immensely from a crisis that they did not create, the World Bank’s Chief Economist for Africa expects up to 700,000 additional infant deaths in Africa because of the crisis and an increase in conflict and decrease in governance quality. Ted Miguel and Ray Fisman have shown how economic shocks greatly increase the likelihood of civil wars and the same is true for a rapid fall in natural resource prices. Offering aid and then withdrawing it can be much worse than not giving anything in the first place. This decade has taught us that failing states, from Afghanistan, to Pakistan, to Somalia are real security problems, not just for their neighbors but also for the West.

If the Gates Foundation and others like it suddenly stopped funding projects in developing countries countless projects that have come to depend on their funds (many of which were started because of it) would have to shut down and it would take a long time for them to recover once the money becomes available again. The cutting of funds would worsen the impact of the crisis in affected countries, increase the time it will take for the global economy to recover, endanger long term research into tropical diseases, and produce a (potentially protectionist) backlash against the United States that we really don’t need right now.

This crisis and the way we get out of it is a chance for the US to show its leadership and creativity in the face of tough problems and together we can achieve that. If you as an individual want to help those less fortunate than you consider making a loan on Kiva or donating to a US charity.

Update: As Lauren pointed out in the comments you can also contribute by spending your time solving important problems and make a career out of making the world a better place.

Update 2: Richard Posner wrote another post supporting the elimination of tax deductions for charitable donations to foreign countries while Gary Becker (on the same blog) had a more nuanced opinion. Posner also maintains that we should regulate such giving which as an entrepreneur leaves me just flabbergasted. Many innovative non-profits started by young upstarts with great ideas such as Kiva, Forge, Face Aids, and Unite for Sight would never have been started under this plan and the world would be worse off for it. Let’s foster entrepreneurship in all sectors of the economy, not limit it without good reason.

What we did is, we got the fourteen major firms in a room down the hall here with their primary supervisors [..] and we said to them “You guys have got to fix this problem, tell us how you are going to fix it and we will work out some basic regime to work out there are no free riders to give you comfort so you know that if you move individually, everybody else will move with you” and there is nothing written, no guidance, no regulation, no formal process, [...]

These fourteen firms he continued, accounted for something like 90% of the all the activity in this market. The Fed, the SEC, the FSA, the Swiss and the Germans were there, and hose were the principals, each firm brought three people, they had an executive committee of four firms that had almost weekly a conference call among the four firms. And the best thing about the process was that it was efficient, there was nothing written except letters from the firm laying out their commitments, there’s no formal mechanism we could have used to force this on anybody so we had to invent it.

You have to have a borderless collaborative process, it does not mean it has to be universal every jurisdiction or every institution it just needs a critical mass of the right players it is a much more concentrated world, if you focus on the limited number of the ten to twenty large institutions that have some global reach, then you can do a lot.

Geithner is right, the world is becoming increasingly international but there are very few effective (and quick acting) international governing bodies and these adhoc meetings work very well. You don’t need to be a believer in World Government to realize that closer international coordination on finance and the economy (if nothing else) will be important in the future. The problem with doing things on an adhoc basis by getting the most powerful people and organizations in one room is that the concerns of the wider populace will be underrepresented (or not represented at all). The hurried actions of the US Treasury and Federal Reserve during the failure/bailout of Bear Stearns, AIG, and Lehman Brothers showed that personal contacts and informal meetings can help ensure quick action in an unforeseen crisis but they also show the dangers and resulting unfairness of the outcomes reached in such meetings. In the years ahead we will have to figure out how to build more effective coordinating (and potentially regulating) bodies on both the national and international scale. That should be a fun challenge.

In Germany December’s machine-tool orders were 40% lower than a year earlier. Half of China’s 9,000 or so toy exporters have gone bust. Taiwan’s shipments of notebook computers fell by a third in the month of January. The number of cars being assembled in America was 60% below January 2008.

Yes these numbers are among the extremes and other industries aren’t faring quite as badly but the core point is that this is an international crisis and it will have serious impact everywhere – goodbye to fantasies of decoupling. A Fistful of Euros has had excellent coverage of how the crisis is affecting European and other countries, things are looking bad in Russia, Ukraine, Japan, Ireland, Latvia, and pretty much everywhere else.

Keynes argued that monetary policy ran the risk of becoming impotent in stimulating demand and raising spending since interest rates were already at their lowest possible level. Essentially he argued that increasing the monetary base by buying short-term government bonds is irrelevant at zero interest rates since money and short-term government bonds become effectively perfect substitutes.

As I said in my last post, however, there are still some things that can be done and while the Fed cannot lower short term interest rates any further it can still influence long term interest rates:

This (monetary policy impotence) argument has been challenged to some extent of late, most notably by Ben Bernanke, who argues that while the central bank may lose policy leverage over short term interest rates, by buying longer term instruments (10 or 30 year bonds) the bank may influence rates further up the yield curve.

This basically means that while short term interest rates have effectively reached zero the Federal Reserve can buy longer term bonds and thereby lower the interest rates on those, and incentivizing banks to shift their money to loan on which they can earn higher yields. This is extremely similar to what is generally known as Quantitive Easing (and unneccessarily complicated sounding term for a relatively simple concept).

Unfortunately even this won’t help too much in the situation that we are currently faced with since it does not address the underlying problem but it is something that other central banks such as the ECB should keep in mind. Some other possible actions a central bank could take are explained in this paper by Gauti Eggertson of the IMF that I have just started reading.

Without getting into the details and starting to argue about different multipliers I also believe that the current stimulus is far from perfect (my perfect stimulus would pretty much look like the one described by Alice Rivlin) and that we have significant work to do on how to improve our chances for long term economic success. As I said recently the centerpiece of such a long term stimulus should be things that make America and all Americans smarter, something I will write more about in the future.

What really has me worried right now though is that Tim Geithner’s proposal for saving and restructuring the banking system is too timid and too unclear at a time when everyone is looking for the government to come up with a clear plan. The reason I am so worried about this is that the rest of the economy will be severely hampered until the banks recover as well. I’ve been worried about this for a while but a recent New York Times article on Japan’s crisis focused this worry even more:

A further lesson from Japan is that the bank rescue will determine the fate of the wider economy. While President Obama has prioritized his stimulus plan, no stimulus is likely to succeed unless the banking sector is repaired.

We have to come up with an effective solution for the banking problem before we can hope to get the rest of the economy going again, and we should think hard about what we need to do and what it will take, even if the solutions might sound politically difficult.

So far, the Obama administration’s plan avoids the hardest decisions, like nationalizing banks, wiping out shareholders or allowing banks to collapse under the weight of their own bad debts. In the end, Japan had to do all those things.

More to come…

One of the main issues with one time tax rebates as economic stimulus in tough economic times is that people will often save a large share of the additional money (in preparation of even worse times that my lie ahead ahead) instead of spending it. This was again seen with last year’s tax rebate and is one of the reasons this year’s stimulus has been structured the way it is (focusing more on infrastructure spending and money to producers).

One way is to give more money to poor who tend to spend a larger share of their income but given the current level of economic uncertainty even these might be less willing to spend. What if there were a way to force or at least strongly incentivize people to spend money they get from particular sources. One method for doing this is through Alternative Currencies, which have recently become more popular for a variety of reasons.

A recent Economist article talked about a number of Alternative Currencies that forced people to spend their money quickly so as not to have to pay special fees, such as the Chiemgauer (which is currently in circulation):

Spent it must be, because it loses value every quarter. The notes have an expiry date after which they need to be renewed with a sticker costing 2% of their value. The quicker money is spent, the faster, in macroeconomic terms, its velocity. Gesell argued that a higher velocity of money helps combat deflation.

Ignoring the bit about velocity of money, this scheme should force people to spend their newly gotten tax rebates if it is received in this kind of currency. It’s definitely unorthodox but I think it definitely sounds like an interesting solution and I’d be very interested to hear what some of the downsides might be.

Update: I’ve long wanted to have an actual reference that I can cite for the claim that people will only spend a small share of a temporary stimulus in uncertain times and I think the following Romer, Bernstein evaluation works pretty well though they don’t actually have any firm numbers but it will do for now:

It is important to note that the jobs effects of temporary broad-based tax cuts would probably be considerably smaller. Large proportions of temporary tax cuts are saved, blunting their stimulatory impact on output and employment.

We live in a technological age where every study shows that the more knowledge you have as a worker and the more knowledge workers you have as an economy, the faster your incomes will rise. Therefore, the centerpiece of our stimulus, the core driving principle, should be to stimulate everything that makes us smarter and attracts more smart people to our shores. That is the best way to create good jobs. 

A government-funded venture capital fund might not be the right solution (that’s a longer question I don’t want to get into now) but he’s right – this is also the time to get smarter, more agile, and more productive.

We don’t want to come out of this crisis with just inflation, a mountain of debt and more shovel-ready jobs. We want to — we have to — come out of it with a new Intel, Google, Microsoft and Apple. I would have loved to have seen the stimulus package include a government-funded venture capital bank to help finance all the start-ups that are clearly not starting up today — in the clean-energy space they’re dying like flies — because of a lack of liquidity from traditional lending sources. 

Newsweek had an essay this week that began: “Could Silicon Valley become another Detroit?” Well, yes, it could. When the best brains in the world are on sale, you don’t shut them out. You open your doors wider.

The system of disclosure that worked so well with regard to traditional securities has not been able to do the job with respect to derivative contracts to put it plainly, investors have a pretty good idea about balance sheet risks, they are completely befuddled with regard to derivative risks.

Another common element has been Alan Greenspan’s refusal to step up regulation, even after witnessing several failures that could have destabilized the entire financial system:

Greenspan’s more serious and longer-running error has been to consistently shrug off the need for regulation and better disclosure with regard to derivative products. Deluded as to the banks’ ability to police themselves before the crisis, Greenspan called for a less burdensome regulatory regime barely six months after it.

His recent admission that he found a “flaw” in his system was widely talked about but even know Greenspan is unsure of how “significant or permanent” this flaw is. His argument that the investors financing LTCM were putting their own money at risk and would therefore implicitly regulate it by only lending to it if it were credible is patently absurd – thinking that a market will adequately price a particular asset is one thing, thinking that a relatively small number of investors will always be able to assess the risk of a complex (and in the case of LCTM secretive) counterparty is quite another. Furthermore, it should also be clear that tolerance of risk increases when investors have not suffered major losses for a number of years and that this has historically led to excessive risk taking. LTCM itself believed that the markets were not rational in the short term and nobody should believe that individual financial institutions will be rational in their lending. As Warren Buffet points out Meriweather, Haghani, Hilibrand, and the crew had all invested almost all of their own money and still made a colossal misjudgment.

[I]t suggests that the best way to proceed is to help third parties rather than the distressed company itself. In other words, instead of bailing out AIG and its creditors, it would have been better for the government to guarantee AIG’s obligations to J.P. Morgan and those who bought insurance from AIG. Such an action would have nipped the contagion in the bud, probably at much smaller cost to taxpayers than the cost of bailing out the whole of AIG. It would also have saved the government from having to take a position on AIG’s viability as a business, which could have been left to a bankruptcy court. Finally, it would have minimized concerns about moral hazard.

I’d be very curious to hear more about what others think about this proposal and how workable it would have been. How exactly would the government have guaranteed some of the complex obligations and what kind of risks would it have taken on by doing so? Would this have assuaged investors’ concerns?