Why I am worried

I believe that fiscal stimulus is both fundamentally sound and very important in the current economic situation that we are in. Monetary policy has largely run out of power, yes, there are certain things that the Federal Reserve can still do but they would most likely be too little too late. I understand why some people are skeptical about borrowing more money when that is a big part of what got us  into this mess in the first place but over the long run a prolonged recession or absence of growth would lead to greater losses in tax revenue then a large and effective stimulus.

Without getting into the details and starting to argue about different multipliers I also believe that the current stimulus is far from perfect (my perfect stimulus would pretty much look like the one described by Alice Rivlin) and that we have significant work to do on how to improve our chances for long term economic success. As I said recently the centerpiece of such a long term stimulus should be things that make America and all Americans smarter, something I will write more about in the future.

What really has me worried right now though is that Tim Geithner’s proposal for saving and restructuring the banking system is too timid and too unclear at a time when everyone is looking for the government to come up with a clear plan. The reason I am so worried about this is that the rest of the economy will be severely hampered until the banks recover as well. I’ve been worried about this for a while but a recent New York Times article on Japan’s crisis focused this worry even more:

A further lesson from Japan is that the bank rescue will determine the fate of the wider economy. While President Obama has prioritized his stimulus plan, no stimulus is likely to succeed unless the banking sector is repaired.

We have to come up with an effective solution for the banking problem before we can hope to get the rest of the economy going again, and we should think hard about what we need to do and what it will take, even if the solutions might sound politically difficult.

So far, the Obama administration’s plan avoids the hardest decisions, like nationalizing banks, wiping out shareholders or allowing banks to collapse under the weight of their own bad debts. In the end, Japan had to do all those things.

More to come…

Alternate Currencies – A Creative Solutiona for Tough Times?

One of the main issues with one time tax rebates as economic stimulus in tough economic times is that people will often save a large share of the additional money (in preparation of even worse times that my lie ahead ahead) instead of spending it. This was again seen with last year’s tax rebate and is one of the reasons this year’s stimulus has been structured the way it is (focusing more on infrastructure spending and money to producers).

One way is to give more money to poor who tend to spend a larger share of their income but given the current level of economic uncertainty even these might be less willing to spend. What if there were a way to force or at least strongly incentivize people to spend money they get from particular sources. One method for doing this is through Alternative Currencies, which have recently become more popular for a variety of reasons.

A recent Economist article talked about a number of Alternative Currencies that forced people to spend their money quickly so as not to have to pay special fees, such as the Chiemgauer (which is currently in circulation):

Spent it must be, because it loses value every quarter. The notes have an expiry date after which they need to be renewed with a sticker costing 2% of their value. The quicker money is spent, the faster, in macroeconomic terms, its velocity. Gesell argued that a higher velocity of money helps combat deflation.

Ignoring the bit about velocity of money, this scheme should force people to spend their newly gotten tax rebates if it is received in this kind of currency. It’s definitely unorthodox but I think it definitely sounds like an interesting solution and I’d be very interested to hear what some of the downsides might be.

Update: I’ve long wanted to have an actual reference that I can cite for the claim that people will only spend a small share of a temporary stimulus in uncertain times and I think the following Romer, Bernstein evaluation works pretty well though they don’t actually have any firm numbers but it will do for now:

It is important to note that the jobs effects of temporary broad-based tax cuts would probably be considerably smaller. Large proportions of temporary tax cuts are saved, blunting their stimulatory impact on output and employment.

Let in the Smart Masses

I generally tend to be pretty skeptical of Tom Friedman’s writing, hoping that he would think about some of the things he says a bit more critically before putting them out to the public as fact, and I don’t agree with much of the (admittedly partially satirical) tone of his last column, but he is 100% right on the core conclusion:

We live in a technological age where every study shows that the more knowledge you have as a worker and the more knowledge workers you have as an economy, the faster your incomes will rise. Therefore, the centerpiece of our stimulus, the core driving principle, should be to stimulate everything that makes us smarter and attracts more smart people to our shores. That is the best way to create good jobs. 

A government-funded venture capital fund might not be the right solution (that’s a longer question I don’t want to get into now) but he’s right – this is also the time to get smarter, more agile, and more productive.

We don’t want to come out of this crisis with just inflation, a mountain of debt and more shovel-ready jobs. We want to — we have to — come out of it with a new Intel, Google, Microsoft and Apple. I would have loved to have seen the stimulus package include a government-funded venture capital bank to help finance all the start-ups that are clearly not starting up today — in the clean-energy space they’re dying like flies — because of a lack of liquidity from traditional lending sources. 

Newsweek had an essay this week that began: “Could Silicon Valley become another Detroit?” Well, yes, it could. When the best brains in the world are on sale, you don’t shut them out. You open your doors wider.

When Genius Failed – The Rise and Fall of Long Term Capital Management

I just finished When Genius Failed – The Rise and Fall of Long Term Capital Management by Roger Lowenstein and as someone who was not following financial news back then it is very interesting to read it now given the events of recent months. The risks of excessive leverage, the increasing appetite for risk taking during prolonged economic upswings, and the lack of understanding of complex derivatives all played a major role in both the collapse of Long Term Capital Management and the current crisis:

The system of disclosure that worked so well with regard to traditional securities has not been able to do the job with respect to derivative contracts to put it plainly, investors have a pretty good idea about balance sheet risks, they are completely befuddled with regard to derivative risks.

Another common element has been Alan Greenspan’s refusal to step up regulation, even after witnessing several failures that could have destabilized the entire financial system:

Greenspan’s more serious and longer-running error has been to consistently shrug off the need for regulation and better disclosure with regard to derivative products. Deluded as to the banks’ ability to police themselves before the crisis, Greenspan called for a less burdensome regulatory regime barely six months after it.

His recent admission that he found a “flaw” in his system was widely talked about but even know Greenspan is unsure of how “significant or permanent” this flaw is. His argument that the investors financing LTCM were putting their own money at risk and would therefore implicitly regulate it by only lending to it if it were credible is patently absurd – thinking that a market will adequately price a particular asset is one thing, thinking that a relatively small number of investors will always be able to assess the risk of a complex (and in the case of LCTM secretive) counterparty is quite another. Furthermore, it should also be clear that tolerance of risk increases when investors have not suffered major losses for a number of years and that this has historically led to excessive risk taking. LTCM itself believed that the markets were not rational in the short term and nobody should believe that individual financial institutions will be rational in their lending. As Warren Buffet points out Meriweather, Haghani, Hilibrand, and the crew had all invested almost all of their own money and still made a colossal misjudgment.

Should we have let them fail?

In a recent WSJ article Oliver Hart and Luigi Zingales suggest that since the main reason behind bailing out the likes of Bear Stearns and AIG because of worries about counter-party risk the government should have instead guaranteed those obligations:

[I]t suggests that the best way to proceed is to help third parties rather than the distressed company itself. In other words, instead of bailing out AIG and its creditors, it would have been better for the government to guarantee AIG’s obligations to J.P. Morgan and those who bought insurance from AIG. Such an action would have nipped the contagion in the bud, probably at much smaller cost to taxpayers than the cost of bailing out the whole of AIG. It would also have saved the government from having to take a position on AIG’s viability as a business, which could have been left to a bankruptcy court. Finally, it would have minimized concerns about moral hazard.

I’d be very curious to hear more about what others think about this proposal and how workable it would have been. How exactly would the government have guaranteed some of the complex obligations and what kind of risks would it have taken on by doing so? Would this have assuaged investors’ concerns?